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INTRODUCTION
A man watched his sister die in front of him as a result of a car
accident, but he could not get relief because Kansas subscribes to the
impact rule.1 Developers cut into a private burial plot, but the family
could not bring a negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED)
claim because Georgia follows the impact rule.2 A mother had to abort
A J.D., Florida A&M University College of Law, 2015. Many thanks to Professor
Markita Cooper for her guidance in writing this article.
1. Tucker v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., CIV.A. 06-1204-MLB, 2007 WL 2155658, at *4
(D. Kan. July 25, 2007).
2. Ryckeley v. Callaway, 412 S.E.2d 826, 827 (Ga. 1992).
267
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her pregnancy because of her doctor’s negligence, but she could not get
relief because of the Kansas impact rule.3 Florida subscribes to the im-
pact rule too, but the Florida impact rule would not bar any of the
above claims.4
The impact rule is an ancient torts doctrine that precludes re-
covery for emotional distress unless the victim has been physically
impacted by the tortfeasor and the emotional distress grew out of that
physical impact.5 The first enunciation of this rule is found in the Vic-
torian Railways case.6 In this case, a gatekeeper invited a coach, which
was transporting a pregnant woman, to cross train tracks.7 The coach
was nearly struck by a train and the pregnant woman/mother suffered
a miscarriage from the shock.8 In the ensuing litigation, she was de-
nied relief because “damage arising from shock or fright, without
impact, was too remote to sustain the action.”9 With this, the impact
rule was created.10
American courts widely adopted the impact rule and it persists
in a handful of states to this day.11 Courts give several reasons for de-
nying such NIED claims and these reasons fall into three broad
categories: judicial efficiency, evidence concerns, and foreseeability.12
Judicial efficiency concerns the flood of litigation that will result if
claims for emotional damages could go forward. How would courts sort
meritorious claims from frivolous claims?13 Evidence concerns deal
with proving the damages. How should a court distinguish a sensitive
person from someone with a tougher constitution? And when some
emotional harm can be acknowledged, how can it be valued by a
3. Humes v. Clinton, 792 P.2d 1032, 1034-35 (Kan. 1990).
4. See Tanner v. Hartog, 696 So. 2d 705, 706 (Fla. 1997); Zell v. Meek, 665 So. 2d
1048, 1054 (Fla. 1995).
5. Willis v. Gami Golden Glades, LLC, 967 So. 2d 846, 850 (Fla. 2007); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1965); 38 AM. JUR. 2D Fright, Shock, Etc. § 12 (2014); Charles E.
Cantu, An Essay on the Tort of Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress in Texas: Stop
Saying It Does Not Exist, 33 ST. MARY’S L.J. 455, 460-61 (2002).
6. Victorian Railway Comm’rs v. Coultas, [1888] 13 App. Cas. 222, 224 (P.C. appeal
taken from Austl.), available at http://swarb.co.uk/victorian-railway-commissioners-v-coul
tas-pc-21-jan-1888/.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See id.
11. Robert J. Rhee, A Principled Solution for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
Claims, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 805, 815 (2004); see infra Part II.
12. Rhee, supra note 11, at 814.
13. See id.; 2 JACOB A. STEIN, STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES TREATISE § 10:29
(3d ed. 2014).
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court?14 Foreseeability protects a tortfeasor from injuries that he could
not have reasonably expected to result from his actions. However,
when there is no physical contact, how can a person know to adjust
their behavior to avoid liability?15
This paper proposes that Florida abrogate the impact rule and
switch to using a general negligence approach for NIED claims. First,
this paper gives an overview of the current state of the Florida impact
rule, its exceptions, and why the rule exists. This overview shows that
the policy benefits that justify the impact rule do not flow from the rule
itself. Next, this paper discusses the impact rules as they stand in the
four other states that still cling to them. Comparison of these jurisdic-
tions with Florida reveals that Florida’s impact rule is the least
restrictive, appearing more like a general negligence analysis. With
this background in mind, discussion of Kentucky’s recent abrogation of
the impact rule and Tennessee’s overruling of the physical manifesta-
tion rule shows that foreseeability is the true core of the impact rule.
Lastly, analysis of impact rule cases under a general negligence ap-
proach shows Florida already functionally uses general negligence
principles in NIED claims. Thus, there is no loss in abrogating the im-
pact rule because Florida is functionally already there.
I. FLORIDA’S IMPACT RULE
Florida is one of five remaining states that adheres to the im-
pact rule.16 Of these states, Florida’s rule is the most complex and the
most unlike the original impact rule.17 To begin, an impact is only re-
quired in negligence actions where the plaintiff is suing for emotional
distress.18 However, an impact is not required if the victim can prove
his emotional injury with some type of physical manifestation.19 These
cases are called direct victim cases.20 Direct victims are harmed by the
tortfeasor’s negligent conduct and the victim brings suit for the result-
ing emotional harm.21 Bystander cases stand in contrast to direct
victim cases, in which a close family member perceives the injury of
14. John J. Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law: Liability for Emotional Harm, 90
MARQ. L. REV. 789, 808 (2007).
15. See id.
16. See infra Part II.
17. See Willis, 967 So. 2d at 850.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Kircher, supra note 14, at 891.
21. See id.
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another person.22 In a bystander case, this close family member wit-
nessing the injury is the plaintiff in the NIED claim.23 Lastly, the
impact rule does not apply in cases where the NIED claim is supported
by facts showing some other freestanding tort.24 In Florida, a free-
standing tort occurs when the defendant should have foreseen the
potential for emotional damage because of the underlying tortious con-
duct.25 Usually, this exception pops up in special relationship
situations, such as doctor-patient or attorney-client.26 This section
gives an overview of the Florida impact rule as it developed in parts:
the direct victim cases, the bystander cases, and the freestanding tort
cases.
A. Direct Victim Cases
Florida direct victim plaintiffs are directly harmed by the defen-
dant’s negligence. In these cases, a garden-variety negligence action is
the main cause of action available.27 Crane v. Loftin28 and Gilliam v.
Stewart29 are good starting points for an overview of the direct victim
cases. Both of these cases show rather mechanical applications of the
impact rule under facts that would probably survive the rule’s applica-
tion today.30 In Crane, a woman drove her car across a railroad
crossing and was struck by a negligently operated train.31 She was not
physically hit because she leapt from the car in the nick of time, but
she suffered from “fright and mental anguish.”32 The driver could not
get relief for this distress because she was not physically impacted.33
Without an impact, the court could not causally tie her emotional dis-
tress to the train.34 This case is a notably old formulation because,
22. Zell, 665 So. 2d at 1054.
23. Id.
24. Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415, 422-23 (Fla. 1992).
25. Id.
26. Rowell v. Holt, 850 So. 2d 474, 480 (Fla. 2003).
27. John M. Logsdon, The Rise and Fall of Bystander Recovery for Negligent Infliction
of Emotional Distress in North Carolina, 21 N.C. CENT. L.J. 319, 323 (1995). This definition
makes more sense when contrasted with the bystander rule. See infra Part II.B.
28. Crane v. Loftin, 70 So. 2d 574, 575-76 (Fla. 1954).
29. Stewart v. Gilliam, 271 So. 2d 466, 466 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972), decision quashed,
291 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974). But see Willis, 967 So. 2d at 850.
30. See Crane, 70 So. 2d at 575-56; Stewart, 271 So. 2d at 466.
31. Crane, 70 So. 2d at 576.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See id. In 1954, the driver could have gotten relief if she could have shown gross
negligence or intent, as such conduct was never contemplated by the impact rule. See id.
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even though relief is denied, there is no discussion of any potential psy-
chological harm, such as post-traumatic stress disorder or some type of
anxiety.35 Gilliam further exposes the harsh nature of the impact rule
as the plaintiff did have a physical injury, just not an impact.36 In Gil-
liam, an elderly woman suffered a heart attack when a car struck her
home.37 She was not physically hit by the car, but heard the crash, ran
out the backdoor to assist, and then returned to bed due to chest
pains.38 The existence of a physically diagnosable injury, which a medi-
cal expert could tie to the car colliding with the house, went
uncompensated because of the impact rule.39
Hagan v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. broadened the definition of an
impact when faced with a food contamination problem.40 In Hagan, a
consumer discovered what appeared to be a used condom in her bottle
of Coke while drinking from it.41 The plaintiff in Hagan actually in-
gested some of the contaminated soda and filed an NIED claim due to
her fear of contracting HIV.42 These facts forced the court to reconsider
a question it addressed in Doyle v. Pillsbury Co. with dicta.43 There, a
woman saw an insect floating in a can of peas, jumped back in alarm,
and fell over a chair.44 In Doyle, the court denied relief because the
consumer had not actually ingested the peas.45 However, the court
questioned the operation of the impact rule since ingestion of contami-
nated food provides a concrete connection for causation, particularly
one that is foreseeable to the defendant.46 Hagan gave this dicta some
35. See id.
36. Gilliam, 271 So. 2d at 466.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Gilliam, 291 So. 2d at 595. Gilliam is noteworthy in Florida’s impact rule history
because the Fourth DCA actually rejected the impact rule. However, the Florida Supreme
Court reversed this decision. Id. The reversal of the lower court’s ruling in Gilliam is quite
brief and cites to the lower court’s opinion for the facts and dissent of the appellate judge for
the reasoning. Id. at 595. The other apparent effect of this reversal is the Fourth DCA gen-
erating harsher impact rule case law than other DCA’s. See, e.g., Thomas v. OB/GYN
Specialists of Palm Beaches, Inc., 889 So. 2d 971, 972 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (denying
relief because stillbirth was not defined in Tanner despite the impact to the mother during
the course of treatment). Ironically, Gilliam reaffirmed Florida’s adherence to the impact
rule, but after subsequent decisions, the case would no longer be barred by the rule because
the homeowner had physical manifestations of her mental injury. See Willis, 967 So. 2d at
850.
40. Hagan v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 804 So. 2d 1234, 1236 (Fla. 2001).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1235.
43. See id. at 1238.
44. Doyle v. Pillsbury Co., 476 So. 2d 1271, 1272 (Fla. 1985).
45. Id.
46. Id.
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concrete facts from which to work.47 Thus, the plaintiff could satisfy
the impact requirement because she actually ingested the contami-
nated food.48
The Hagan holding had two effects on the Florida impact rule.
First, the court construed ingestion of contaminated food as an im-
pact.49 While this leap in construction is not without its logic as
contaminated food does literally impact the person eating it, it is nev-
ertheless not a case envisioned in the classic Gilliam version of the
rule.50 Second, the court did not require any physical manifestation of
the emotional injury.51 These two modifications to the impact rule
were acceptable in this case because a manufacturer of food products
should be able to foresee a person becoming ill if they ingest contami-
nated food.52 Even if that harm is purely emotional, the emotional
harm that potentially flows from eating contaminated food is easily un-
derstood.53 The experience is common to lawyers and laypersons
alike.54 Keep in mind the foreseeability analysis here as it plays a criti-
cal role in the other types of impact rule cases in Florida.
The latest in the line of direct victim cases is Willis v. Gami
Golden Glades, LLC.55 In Willis, a guest at a hotel asked a security
guard for assistance in parking her car because the lot was dark and
unfamiliar, and she feared for her safety.56 The guard refused to help
or even watch as she parked. While getting out of her car, a robber put
a gun to her head.57 The assailant took her purse and then patted her
down after removing articles of her clothing.58 After this traumatic
event, the gunman stole her car and drove off.59 The hotel guest col-
lected herself and again asked the security guard for help, who
47. See Hagan, 804 So. 2d at 1239.
48. Id. at 1241.
49. Id.
50. See id. But see Gilliam, 291 So. 2d at 595.
51. Hagan, 804 So. 2d at 1241.
52. Id.
53. See id.
54. See id. The advance of medical knowledge no doubt hurts the impact rule as well,
as courts no longer are doubtful of injuries that are not physical in nature. See Kevin C.
Klein & G. Nicole Hininger, Mitigation of Psychological Damages: An Economic Analysis of
the Avoidable Consequences Doctrine and Its Applicability to Emotional Distress Injuries, 29
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 405, 426 (2004).
55. Willis, 967 So. 2d at 848.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 849.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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pretended as if he had not seen her earlier.60 The hotel office personnel
also refused any assistance, so she went to her room and spent the
night in sleepless agony.61 Doctors later diagnosed her with anxiety,
depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder, for which there are
some physical symptoms.62 The court resolved this case by holding the
impact of the gun to her temple and the pat down she endured was
more than enough.63
Willis is a milestone in Florida jurisprudence for a number of
reasons. For purposes of the direct victim cases, the impact served a
function of form and not substance.64 While the gun being placed to the
hotel guest’s head is certainly a traumatic experience, there is no doubt
that the psychological trauma that the “impact” produced is the harm
at issue, not any harm flowing from a physical injury.65 This holding
leaves one wondering what would have happened in this case absent
the gun actually touching the hotel guest and the pat down.66 How-
ever, this is where direct victim cases stand in Florida. The impact
need only be minimal, and it does not need to physically cause the emo-
tional injury.67 As discussed below, these physical manifestations of an
emotional injury obviate the need for an impact completely.
B. Bystander Cases
Bystander cases are those in which the plaintiff witnesses harm
being done to a third party by the defendant and sues for the resulting
emotional distress.68 Bystander cases began carving out exceptions
earlier than the direct victim line, with the first major case being
Champion v. Gray.69 In Champion, a mother heard a car crash.70 She
60. Id.
61. Willis, 967 So. 2d at 849.
62. Id. These symptoms include sexual dysfunction, peripheral temperature changes,
muscle tightening, and increased sweat gland activity. These symptoms are mentioned to
show that the line between physical manifestation and purely psychic injuries is becoming
quite blurred. However, some of the frivolous cases which will be mentioned later could no
doubt point to similar symptoms. See, e.g., Elliott v. Elliott, 58 So. 3d 878, 882 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2011) (alleging stress, diabetes, and hair loss).
63. Id. at 851.
64. See id. at 850-51.
65. See id.
66. See infra Part IV. Willis also has some relevance to the freestanding tort exception
found in Florida law, which will be discussed below. Infra Part II.C.
67. See Willis, 967 So. 2d at 850.
68. David Sampedro, When Living As Husband and Wife Isn’t Enough: Reevaluating
Dillon’s Close Relationship Test in Light of Dunphy v. Gregor, 25 STETSON L. REV. 1085,
1086 (1996).
69. Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17, 18 (Fla. 1985).
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came running to the scene of the accident and, seeing her daughter’s
dead body, died from shock on the spot.71 The mother was not physi-
cally impacted in any way, and she actually died from a heart attack.72
However, the causal connection of her death to the driver’s negligence
was inescapable.73 This left the court the options of reaffirming the
harsh results of Gilliam or creating some type of exception to recognize
the emotional distress of bystanders.74 In choosing the latter course,
the court adopted a bystander test similar to the famous Dillon rule.75
The bystander test announced in Champion allows for an NIED claim
to proceed when a person perceives the negligent injury of a close fam-
ily member.76 Thus, the mother is a bystander because she heard the
car crash and subsequently died upon seeing the injury to her
daughter.77
First, note the requirement of a physical injury. Champion was
an easy case in one sense, because dying is the ultimate injury; the
court did not need to contend with the additional complexity of purely
mental damages, such as depression or post-traumatic stress disor-
der.78 Second, the mother did not actually see the accident, she heard
it.79 Thus, in announcing this holding, Florida received a broader by-
stander rule than it otherwise might have if the mother had seen the
accident.80 Lastly, the court is clear to call this a factor test that is
enveloped under the “guidepost” of foreseeability.81 The presence of all
these factors does not necessarily mean that the defendant is under a
duty, only that the defendant may foresee emotional harm.82
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See id.
74. Id.
75. Champion, 478 So. 2d at 19. Dillon v. Legg is the seminal bystander case based not
on the zone of danger, but a close relationship with the direct victim. There, a bystander
claim was allowed to go forward for a mother that watched her daughter die in a car acci-
dent because she was closely related to the victim, saw the accident, and was close to the
scene of the accident. 441 P.2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968).
76. Champion, 478 So. 2d at 19. The distinction between bystander cases and direct
victim cases is not as explicit as it is in other jurisdictions.
77. Id. This test is distinguished from the zone of danger test, which is noted for its
poor application to bystander cases where the bystander has no fear for his own safety. See,
e.g., Vaillancourt v. Med. Ctr. Hosp. of Vermont, Inc., 425 A.2d 92, 95 (Vt. 1980) (showing
the limitations to the zone of danger test as the only vehicle for bystander liability).
78. See Champion, 478 So. 2d at 18.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 19.
81. See id. at 19-20.
82. See id. at 20.
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Zell v. Meek is the latest bystander case to leave its mark on the
impact rule.83 Zell added to Champion by stretching the length of time
between the injury and its physical manifestation.84 In Zell, a tenant
picked up an unmarked package left on his doorstep.85 The package
was a bomb that exploded and killed the tenant.86 His daughter had
the misfortune of witnessing her father’s dying moments.87 Subse-
quent investigation revealed that the property manager had received
bomb threats at this particular property in the past and made no warn-
ing to the family living there.88 Immediately after this incident, the
daughter experienced purely psychological injuries:  insomnia, depres-
sion, fear of loud noises, bad dreams, and short-term memory loss.89
Nine months later, she was diagnosed with a number of digestive ail-
ments.90 A medical expert traced these ailments to the daughter’s
anxious condition produced by the bombing.91 The Champion court did
not face such a difficult causation issue since the mother died shortly
after seeing her daughter.92 However, in this case, the nine-month in-
terval forced the court to relax the short time requirement implicit in
the Champion holding.93 In so doing, the court acknowledged any
bright line time requirement would be arbitrary.94 The time between
the physical manifestations of the injury and the incident is a factor
bearing on causation, not the element of causation itself.95
Zell is not nearly as groundbreaking as Champion, then, as by-
stander actions were already permitted and physical symptoms of the
injury are still required.96 If Zell is groundbreaking, it is due to the
absence of language limiting its holding to bystander cases.97 Recall
83. Zell, 665 So. 2d at 1054.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1049.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Zell, 665 So. 2d at 1049. This case would have presented a much more challenging
question for the court if the claim would have been brought closer in time to the bombing.
The injuries were squarely within the realm of the ad hoc exceptions the court had been
creating up to this point due to the obvious credibility of the injury, but there were no physi-
cal symptoms yet. See id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1049-50.
92. See Champion, 478 So. 2d at 18.
93. See Zell, 665 So. 2d at 1053; Champion, 478 So. 2d at 20.
94. Zell, 665 So. 2d at 1052.
95. See id. at 1054.
96. See id.
97. See Julie H. Littky-Rubin, So I Finally Understand the “Impact Rule” but Why Does
It Still Exist?, FLA. B.J., April 2008, at 20, 24.
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from Champion that its factor test does not necessarily bring liability
but, rather, only bears on the existence of foreseeability.98 Florida does
not clearly separate bystander cases from direct victim cases, so the
physical manifestation requirement could potentially be applied to di-
rect victim cases.99 The import of this lack of separation would allow
direct victims to bring suit absent an impact, so long as they have
physical symptoms to evidence the emotional trauma. This proposition
received support in Willis, where the court disapproved of language in
Ruttger Hotel Corp. v. Wagner that limited Champion to bystander
cases.100
C. Freestanding Tort Cases
The freestanding tort exception is a limitation on the impact
rule.101 When a freestanding tort is present in conduct that gives rise
to an NIED claim, the impact rule has no application.102 Generally, a
freestanding tort is one where the plaintiff would be able to sue on a
cause of action other than a negligence claim without having to prove
emotional damages to prevail.103 In Florida, when the facts support a
freestanding tort, the impact rule does not apply because the tort other
than the negligence claim creates foreseeability for the defendant.104
Kush v. Lloyd was the first case in this series.105 In Kush, a
couple had a baby who had the misfortune of being born with genetic
abnormalities.106 The couple wanted to have another child, but out of
concern for his potential disabilities, they consulted a doctor.107 Their
doctor misdiagnosed a genetic disorder and incorrectly told the parents
that they could have children free of genetic defects.108 The parents
conceived and gave birth to another baby with the same genetic abnor-
98. See Champion, 478 So. 2d at 19-20.
99. See Littky-Rubin, supra note 97, at 24.
100. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 526 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(extending the physical manifestation rule to direct victim cases), quoted with approval in
Willis, 967 So. 2d at 850-51. But see Ruttger Hotel Corp. v. Wagner, 691 So. 2d 1177, 1179
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (calling Champion a bystander rule), disapproved of by Willis, 967
So. 2d at 851.
101. Kush, 616 So. 2d at 422.
102. Id.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. Id. at 417.
106. Id.
107. Kush, 616 So. 2d at 417
108. Id.
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malities.109 Suing under a negligence theory, the parents sought
damages for the mental anguish they now suffered.110 In allowing for
emotional damages, the court reasoned that freestanding torts, such as
defamation and wrongful birth, stand apart from a negligence action,
because these torts would lie even without the attendant emotional in-
jury.111 The emotional damages would then be parasitic to the
damages otherwise recoverable in the claim of wrongful birth against
the doctor.112 This reasoning is buttressed by the availability of emo-
tional damages in torts like defamation and invasion of privacy.113 In
those actions, it is wholly foreseeable to the tortfeasor that emotional
damages could result.114 Thus, the impact rule is not needed to prove
foreseeability.115
Such reasoning applied to Kush, because the tort of wrongful
birth compensates the parents for the additional cost of rearing a
handicapped child.116 The doctor is liable under such a theory because
the parents might not have conceived had the doctor not been negli-
gent.117 The parents in Kush had a cause of action for those damages
not because they could prove negligence as to their emotional state, but
because of the doctor’s actions giving rise to the wrongful birth
claim.118 The emotional damages were parasitic to that cause of action.
Again, the common theme of foreseeability arises in the analy-
sis to trump the impact rule.119 In freestanding tort cases, this
happens because the tortfeasor can foresee the emotional damage that
can result from the underlying tort.120 However, when an action comes
within the freestanding tort exception, that case is now a freestanding
tort, creating a whole new cause of action.121 Thus, after Kush, Florida
109. Id.
110. Id. at 422.
111. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 47, cmt. b (1965)); W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts 362 (5th ed. 1984).
112. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 47, cmt. b. Freestanding torts, as refer-
enced in the Restatement, contemplate a situation where the tortfeasor intended on
committing one tort and incidentally invades another legally protected interest of the vic-
tim. Id.
113. Kush, 616 So. 2d at 422.
114. Id.
115. See id.; Dilan A. Esper & Gregory C. Keating, Putting “Duty” in Its Place: A Reply
to Professors Goldberg and Zipursky, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1225, 1265-66 (2008).
116. Kush, 616 So. 2d at 422.
117. Id. at 417, n.2.
118. See id. at 422.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id.; Thomas, 889 So. 2d at 972.
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recognized a cause of action for wrongful birth outside the scope of neg-
ligence actions.122
Tanner v. Hartog presented a slightly different question when a
doctor’s alleged negligence caused a baby to be stillborn.123 In Tanner,
doctors sent the mother to a hospital for testing and the next day her
baby was stillborn.124 The mother and her husband asserted a claim of
negligent stillbirth against the doctors.125 This question is somewhat
different than Kush for a couple of reasons. First, the baby was still-
born, so the wrongful birth cause of action created in Kush was
unavailable.126 Second, no cause of action for negligent stillbirth ex-
isted in Florida, so the parents here essentially brought a malpractice
claim.127 This was not a problem in Kush, because the tort of wrongful
birth existed elsewhere, and that cause of action could be proven with-
out a need to satisfy the impact rule.128 But since Tanner is essentially
a negligence action standing alone, it was a pure NIED claim.129
Therefore, the foreseeability of emotional harm needed to be proven
through the element of duty, placing the impact rule squarely in the
father’s path to relief.130
In working through Tanner, the court noted that some jurisdic-
tions have disposed of this question by holding the doctor’s treatment
of the fetus as an impact.131 In jurisdictions where the fetus is not con-
sidered a separate legal entity but instead a living tissue of the mother,
any impact on the fetus is technically an impact on the mother.132
Thus, the mother is impacted and the impact rule is not an obstacle.133
122. See Kush, 616 So. 2d at 423.
123. Tanner, 696 So. 2d at 706. Tanner has a more limited factual background because
the appeal originated from the motion to dismiss stage. See id. This appeal encompasses
just the claim of the father and certifies a question to the Florida Supreme Court: “Does the
law of this state support a cause of action for emotional damages of an expectant father and
mother resulting from a stillbirth caused by the negligent act of another?” Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Kush, 616 So. 2d at 417, n.2. The wrongful birth cause of action compensates
the parents for the cost of raising a child they otherwise would not have conceived. Although
this is a rather chilling distinction to draw, the parents would not have incurred those costs
in Tanner, so their emotional distress damages stood alone. See Tanner, 696 So. 2d at 708.
127. See Tanner, 696 So. 2d at 708. The father is the only party present in the appeal
because the impact portion of the impact rule was overcome by the impact on the mother
through the delivery process. Id. at 706.
128. See Kush, 616 So. 2d at 422.
129. See Tanner, 696 So. 2d at 707.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See id.
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The court rejected this escape route and adopted the reasoning in
Kush.134 In doing so, the court created another new cause of action just
as it did in Kush:  negligent stillbirth.135 Now, instead of resorting to
distorted constructions of an impact or creating an exception, the court
places this tort outside the realm of general negligence actions with
freestanding torts such as trespass and defamation.136 Since the fore-
seeability of emotional harm flows from the nature of the tort, a
plaintiff need not overcome the impact rule in order to prevail.137
However, it must be noted that even the Kush reasoning has its
harsh limitations. In Thomas, a doctor negligently misdiagnosed and
terminated a pregnancy.138 Thus, the parents could not point to a
wrongful birth or a stillbirth.139 The father and husband brought an
NIED claim.140 However, rather than analyze the claim for the pres-
ence of conduct which created foreseeability, which is the essence of the
Kush analysis, the question turned on whether termination of the
pregnancy was a stillbirth within the Tanner cause of action.141 Recog-
nizing that Tanner created a new cause of action, the court could not fit
the facts of this case into the definition of a stillbirth as it existed in
Tanner.142 Therefore, the father could not proceed on his NIED claim
despite a set of facts just as meritorious as those presented in
Tanner.143
Gracey v. Eaker moved Kush out of the realm of hospitals and
applied it to a therapy setting.144 In Gracey, a licensed therapist treat-
ing a husband and wife as separate patients revealed the confidences
of those sessions to all parties, contrary to a statutorily imposed
duty.145 The court held that the impact rule did not apply, in part be-
cause of the Kush reasoning.146 Just as in Kush, emotional damages
are foreseeable because a therapist should realize his patients are en-
134. See id.
135. See Tanner, 696 So. 2d at 707.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. Thomas, 889 So. 2d at 971. The facts of this case are particularly unsettling. The
doctor negligently removed an arm from the fetus in utero while he was still alive thinking
the pregnancy symptoms were caused by a molar pregnancy. Id. at 971.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 972.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. Gracey v. Eaker, 837 So. 2d 348, 351 (Fla. 2002).
145. Id.
146. Id.
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trusting him with their innermost secrets.147 The statutory duty owed
to the patients buttressed this argument, leaving the therapist without
the impact rule as a defense.148 This was an important step in the Flor-
ida impact rule, as the statutory duty could have been enough to
invoke Kush without placing emphasis on the special relationship.149
However, the court went on to emphasize the special relationship be-
tween the parties and its role in foreseeability.150 This left the door
open for other special relationships that could limit the impact rule’s
application.
The plaintiff in Rowell v. Holt sought to take advantage of this
open door, asserting the attorney-client relationship.151 Rowell in-
volved a public defender who received a document from his or her
client that completely exonerated the client and would have secured
his release from pretrial detention.152 The public defender either lost
this document or forgot about it, and the mistake was only realized
when another public defender happened to interview the still incarcer-
ated client.153 The wrongfully detained client brought an NIED claim
for his unnecessarily long incarceration, to which the Office of the Pub-
lic Defender answered with the impact rule.154 Following the reasoning
of Kush, the court found the impact rule did not apply here because of
the attorney-client relationship and the clearly foreseeable emotional
harm that resulted because of the public defender’s failure to act.155
Kush clearly implicated a doctor-patient relationship, but the relation-
ship itself did not play a central role in the analysis.156 However,
Rowell put another special relationship on the NIED map.157 First,
doctor-patient relationships are implicated. Next, therapist-patient re-
lationships are explicitly mentioned, and now attorney-client
relationships are, too.158
This special relationship argument is where Willis leaves its
mark on the freestanding tort cases. Recall in Willis, a robber held a
147. Id.
148. Id. at 357.
149. See id. at 356.
150. See Gracey, 837 So. 2d at 356.
151. Rowell, 850 So. 2d at 476-77.
152. Id. at 476-77. The opinion in Rowell is careful to not reveal the identity of the attor-
neys that met with Rowell. Id.
153. Id. at 477.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 479-80.
156. See Kush, 616 So. 2d at 417.
157. See id.; Rowell, 850 So. 2d at 480; Gracey, 937 So. 2d at 357.
158. See Rowell, 850 So. 2d at 480; Gracey, 937 So. 2d at 357; Kush, 616 So. 2d at 417.
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hotel guest at gunpoint and the impact of the gun to her head satisfied
the impact rule.159 If the hotel guest had sued the robber, the inten-
tional torts of assault and battery would overwhelm the negligence
action and more clearly implicate the Kush line of cases.160 If the rela-
tionship between doctor and patient is enough to foresee emotional
harm, surely that between robber and victim will suffice to support
parasitic emotional damages.161 However, the hotel had not committed
any freestanding torts, so those causes of action were unavailable.162
Therefore, it is unknown how the court would apply the freestanding
tort exception in cases where the defendant is not the party who com-
mitted the freestanding tort.163 However, requiring the hotel to act in
such a way to preserve the hotel guest’s emotional tranquility only af-
ter the gunman touched her does indicate the court may not be
troubled by this degree of separation.164
Perhaps most relevant to the freestanding tort line is that the
court is able to avoid cementing the special relationship exception,
leaving Kush as an ad hoc limitation to the impact rule’s construc-
tion.165 Rowell, Gracey, and Kush began the making of this exception,
and if the courts were to extend it to the innkeeper-guest relationship,
Florida would be hard-pressed to avoid calling this something other
than a special relationship exception. Certainly, an innkeeper is sub-
stantially less charged with the emotional tranquility of his or her
guests than a therapist of his or her patients.166 However, the easy
resolution of Willis through the impact rule left this issue
untouched.167
159. Willis, 967 So. 2d at 850.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See Willis, 967 So. 2d at 848. This issue was actually the third certified question in
Willis. Id.
166. See Rowell, 850 So. 2d at 480; Gracey, 937 So. 2d at 357; Kush, 616 So. 2d at 417;
see also Woodard v. Jupiter Christian Sch., Inc., 913 So. 2d 1188, 1191 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2005) (dismissing the case due to the lack of a special relationship exception despite the
statutory duty of the clergy to keep communications confidential). Woodard is a fascinating
case. There, a high school student confessed to his teacher/minister under the assurance of
confidentiality that he was homosexual. The teacher revealed these confidences to adminis-
trators and other students, and the student brought an NIED claim. Therefore, this case
presents the special relationship exception question and facts that give rise to a freestand-
ing tort analysis. See id. However, the appeal to the Florida Supreme Court was dismissed,
albeit with a dissent along the freestanding tort lines. Id. (Pariente, J., dissenting). But see
Willis, 967 So. 2d at 848.
167. See Willis, 967 So. 2d at 850.
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Lastly, Willis marks another instance in which the appellate
courts in Florida certified questions to the Florida Supreme Court on
the how the impact rule should operate.168 One of the supposed bene-
fits of the impact rule is its creation of a bright line for the existence of
foreseeability in an NIED claim.169 However, the number of certified
questions regarding how to apply it would suggest that the line drawn
is anything but bright.170
D. Justifications for Florida’s Impact Rule
Throughout these lines of cases, Florida has maintained the
traditional policy justifications for the impact rule: foreseeability, evi-
dentiary concerns, and judicial efficiency.171 However, these cases have
shown numerous situations in which foreseeability is more clearly
proven despite the lack of an impact.172 The impact rule is a per se rule
of foreseeability.173 To acknowledge that foreseeability is present in
these cases absent an impact is to acknowledge that Florida is not de-
riving this benefit from the impact rule. Evidence concerns are not
what they used to be one hundred years ago. Experts capable of prov-
ing purely emotional damages are available in situations in which they
are needed.174 Lastly, the flood of litigation has not occurred any-
where.175 These justifications are seen in the approaches of other
states, as discussed below.
168. Id. at 848.
169. See Lee v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 533 S.E.2d 82, 86 (Ga. 2000).
170. E.g., Willis, 967 So. 2d at 848 (certifying four questions); Rowell, 850 So. 2d at 475-
76 (certifying one question); Gracey, 837 So. 2d at 350 (certifying one question); Hagan, 804
So. 2d at 1235 (certifying one question); Tanner, 696 So. 2d at 706 (certifying one question);
R.J. v. Humana of Florida, Inc., 652 So. 2d 360, 362 (Fla. 1995) (asking how the impact rule
operates in a case of negligent HIV diagnosis); Zell, 665 So. 2d at 1054 (certifying a two-part
question); Kush, 616 So. 2d at 417 (certifying one question and conflict with another DCA);
Champion, 478 So. 2d at 18 (certifying one question).
171. Zell, 665 So. 2d at 1050-51. Zell dwells more on causation, because the specific
issue there is whether the time interval between the physical manifestations and the bomb-
ing bar the claim. However, when causation is not so questionable, this justification distills
to whether the defendant could have foreseen the emotional harm. See Hagan, 804 So. 2d at
1239.
172. See Zell, 665 So. 2d at 1050 (finding bystander liability); Kush, 616 So. 2d at 422
(finding liability based on foreseeability).
173. See Lee, 533 S.E.2d at 86.
174. Kircher, supra note 14, at 808.
175. See Osborne v. Keeney, 399 S.W.3d 1, 18 n.39 (Ky. 2012); infra Part III.C.
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II. THE IMPACT RULE IN OTHER STATES
A. Indiana
Indiana follows the impact rule, but physical manifestations of
the injury are not required in a direct victim claim.176 However, if the
impact or manifestation is minimal, the direct victim-plaintiff must
show that the injury is serious and not speculative.177 For example, a
restaurant customer successfully asserted an NIED claim against a
restaurant when he ate a portion of a meal that had been cooked with a
worm.178 Eating the contaminated food served as the impact.179 Even
though this impact does not have the force of a negligently driven car,
the evidence showed genuine emotional distress that was foreseeable
by the restaurant.180
The court defined the outer limits of this test in Atlantic Coast
Airlines v. Cook.181 In the months after September 11th, airline pas-
sengers watched an unsettled passenger harass flight attendants,
smoke cigarettes on the plane, and attempt to obtain a seat near the
cockpit door.182 The passenger’s actions were alarming enough for the
plaintiff to secure the assistance of other passengers in case an immi-
nent threat of attack arose.183 The flight ended uneventfully, but the
plaintiff brought an NIED claim against the airline for failing to con-
trol a flight security risk.184 Faced with the impact rule, the passenger
asserted the cigarette smoke from the security risk passenger and the
vibrations in the floor of the airplane as the impacts sustained.185 This
invoked the de minimis impact/serious injury test, and the court found
176. Conder v. Wood, 716 N.E.2d 432, 435 (Ind. 1999). Conder is more appropriately
categorized as a bystander case, but since the victim sustained an impact from banging on
the truck that was crushing her friend, the direct victim/bystander distinction was not made
until later. Thus, language from Conder pops up in direct victim and bystander cases. See,
e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. D’Angelo, 875 N.E.2d 789, 796 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App.
2007) (asserting a direct impact from trying to lift a car off of the accident victim despite the
presence of bystander facts); Atl. Coast Airlines v. Cook, 857 N.E.2d 989, 996 (Ind. 2006)
(citing Conder for requirement of an impact, even though impact has not been required
since 2000 for bystander cases).
177. Atl. Coast Airlines, 857 N.E.2d at 996.
178. Holloway v. Bob Evans Farms, Inc., 695 N.E.2d 991, 996 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
179. See id.
180. See id. at 996-97.
181. Cook, 857 N.E.2d at 991-92.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 999.
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the injury not one within the ambit of relief.186 The lack of medical
treatment and symptoms to describe the emotional distress, other than
anxiety during the event, led the court to describe the injury as transi-
tory and similar to emotions many passengers feel on airplanes
daily.187 Thus, the impact rule in Indiana does keep out apparently
frivolous claims,188 but the impact rule is applied in name only. The
Indiana courts are actually applying a serious injury test, only al-
lowing plaintiffs to proceed on significant emotional injuries
foreseeable to the defendant.189
The bystander line of cases started in Shaumber v. Hender-
son.190 There, a mother and her daughter watched helplessly as their
son and brother, respectively, died from his injuries following a car
crash.191 The survivors successfully asserted a negligence action
against the drunk driver for their physical injuries, but they were more
severely injured emotionally from the lost family member.192 Instead of
getting rid of the impact rule, Indiana chose to create the “direct in-
volvement” rule.193 It allows claims for emotional distress to go
forward if the impact is not causative of the emotional distress, so long
as the plaintiff is directly involved in the injury to the third party.194 In
asserting the direct involvement rule, a plaintiff must show the emo-
tional damages are serious in nature and would normally be suffered
by a reasonable person.195
Even though the mother and daughter were both impacted in
Shaumber, the impact requirement did not last long.196 Groves v. Tay-
lor held no impact upon the bystander is needed.197 There, an eight-
year-old girl heard her six-year-old brother struck by a car.198 She then
turned to see his body rolling off the road.199 By allowing for recovery
because of the daughter’s direct involvement in the incident, absent
186. Id. at 1000.
187. Cook, 857 N.E.2d at 999-1000.
188. Ross v. Cheema, 716 N.E.2d 435, 437 (Ind. 1999) (denying an NIED claim where
the impact derives from a courier knocking on the front door).
189. See Cook, 857 N.E.2d at 999; Holloway, 695 N.E.2d at 996.
190. Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452, 453 (Ind. 1991).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 456.
194. See id.
195. Id.
196. Groves v. Taylor, 729 N.E.2d 569, 573 (Ind. 2000).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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any impact upon her, Indiana’s bystander rule was formed.200 The rule
in Groves is more akin to the Dillon rule: a fatal or serious injury sus-
tained by a person with a close relationship to the bystander, which
would cause emotional distress to a reasonable person, only needs to be
perceived by the bystander.201
Finally, Indiana also has an intentional tort exception, which
applies when the defendant’s conduct is akin to a crime or intentional
tort, like arson,202 defamation,203 or fraud.204 Such intentional conduct
is outside the scope of the impact rule because the foreseeability func-
tion of the impact rule is unnecessary when the defendant acts with
intent.205 The intentional tort exception is exactly that and does not
necessarily run to freestanding torts, like negligent stillbirth. In Span-
gler v. Betchel, a baby was stillborn after alleged negligent treatment
while the baby was still in utero.206 Instead of recognizing the foresee-
ability that would flow from the malpractice action, the court allowed
the NIED claim to go forward because of the impact of the treatment to
the mother.207 Therefore, an impact is required in the negligent still-
birth context.208
Taken together, the Indiana impact rule is perhaps nearly non-
existent, but still stricter than the Florida impact rule. Indiana’s
highly technical application of the de minimis impact, in conjunction
with the serious injury test, functions similarly to the direct-victim line
of cases in Florida.209 Both bystander rules are versions of the Dillon
rule and no longer require any type of impact on the bystander.210 The
freestanding tort exception in Florida is broader than the Indiana in-
tentional tort exception since it encompasses torts that are negligence-
based.211 While Florida has created the negligent stillbirth action, In-
200. See id.; Shaumber, 579 N.E.2d at 453.
201. Groves, 729 N.E.2d at 573-74.
202. Kline v. Kline, 64 N.E. 9, 10 (Ind. 1902). The facts of Kline would also support an
assault claim. Id. at 9.
203. Lazarus Dep’t Store v. Sutherlin, 544 N.E.2d 513, 526 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).
204. Groves v. First Nat’l Bank of Valparaiso, 518 N.E.2d 819, 829 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988).
205. Shaumber, 579 N.E.2d at 454.
206. Spangler v. Bechtel, 958 N.E.2d 458, 460 (Ind. 2011).
207. See id. at 468 n.6.
208. See id. at 467.
209. Compare Holloway, 695 N.E.2d at 996-97, Conder, 716 N.E.2d at 435, Atl. Coast
Airlines, 857 N.E.2d at 999, and Shaumber, 579 N.E.2d at 454, with Willis, 967 So. 2d at
850, Hagan, 804 So. 2d at 1236, Zell, 665 So. 2d at 1053, and Elliott, 58 So. 3d at 882.
210. Compare Conder, 716 N.E.2d at 435, and Shaumber, 579 N.E.2d at 454, with Zell,
665 So. 2d at 1053.
211. Compare Spangler, 958 N.E.2d at 467-68, with Tanner, 696 So. 2d at 706.
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diana still resolves these cases through the impact rule.212 Indiana’s
approach has limitations, such as failing to recognize the emotional
well-being of the father or situations where there is no impact, even
under the Indiana impact rule.213 Indiana’s impact rule has been some-
what modernized, but Florida’s impact rule exceptions are broader,
particularly due to the freestanding tort line of cases.214
B. Georgia
The Georgia impact rule follows a similar exception-riddled his-
tory, with Chambley v. Apple Restaurants, Inc. towing the direct victim
line of cases.215 In Chambley, a restaurant customer noticed an un-
wrapped condom in the salad she was eating.216 The restaurant
customer grew nauseous and required medical treatment.217 However,
the evidence in the case tended to show the physical symptoms
stemmed from her knowledge of eating the contaminated food as op-
posed to any harm the contaminants themselves caused.218 Thus, the
impact required is minimal and the emotional distress must stem from
the impact, but the physical injury need not relate to it.219
Lee v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co. created the bystander excep-
tion.220 Lee involved a mother who watched her daughter succumb to
her injuries after they were both involved in a car crash.221 Prior to
Lee, there was no bystander rule, however, the Lee court took a very
small step forward.222 Georgia’s impact rule required a plaintiff to sus-
tain a physical impact, which would cause a physical injury, and then
cause the mental injury.223 Instead of creating a wholly new bystander
212. See Spangler, 958 N.E.2d at 467-68.
213. See id. But see Tanner, 696 So. 2d at 706.
214. Compare Spangler, 958 N.E.2d at 467-68, with Tanner, 696 So. 2d at 706.
215. Chambley v. Apple Rest., Inc., 504 S.E.2d 551, 552 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 552.
219. Id. at 500. While the majority is content to resolve this case through the impact
rule with the nausea and vomiting evincing the physical injury, the concurrence would infer
malicious intent from the presence of an unwrapped condom in food. Id. at 554 (Eldridge, J.,
concurring); see also OB-GYN Assocs. of Albany v. Littleton, 410 S.E.2d 121, 121 (Ga. 1991).
Littleton formed much of the current Georgia impact rule, where allegedly negligent medical
treatment led to the death of a two-day-old infant. In the ensuing NIED claim, recovery was
not permitted for the mother’s emotional distress if it stemmed from the death of the baby
and not any impact on the mother. See id.
220. Lee, 533 S.E.2d at 83.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
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rule, the court simply eliminated the third requirement of the impact
rule.224 Therefore, bystanders could bring an action if they suffered an
impact and were physically injured, but the mental injury need not
come from the physical injury.225 The Georgia Supreme Court has not
addressed the holding of Lee to date. This leaves two main questions
open. First, whether Lee is solely a bystander rule or whether it ex-
tends to direct victim cases.226 Second, whether the impact will be
required in a bystander type-case.227
Georgia also applies what, at first glance, is a special relation-
ship-type limitation on the rule’s applicability.228 For example, in
Bruscato v. O’Brien, the impact rule did not apply to a medical mal-
practice claim against a psychiatrist who negligently discontinued
medicating a patient.229 The patient then killed his mother due to his
un-medicated mental state.230 The doctor-patient relationship created
the foreseeability that the impact rule seeks to impose.231 Thus, the
impact rule was unnecessary.232 Bruscato is unclear on whether a spe-
cial relationship exception actually exists, though, or if the
foreseeability derived more from the cause of action sounding in medi-
cal malpractice.233 While this distinction may be irrelevant in
Bruscato, moving forward, such a distinction might determine if this
exception could grow beyond medical malpractice facts.234 The Brus-
cato analysis touched upon the statutory pleading requirements and
rules governing medical standards of conduct, discussing how these
rules establish foreseeability.235 These rules also served the policy jus-
224. Id. at 87.
225. Id.
226. Compare Wilson v. Allen, 612 S.E.2d 39, 41 n.4 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (denying relief
because the injury did not cause mental suffering in a direct victim-type case, but noting the
potential applicability of Lee), with Grizzle v. Norsworthy, 664 S.E.2d 296, 298 (Ga. Ct. App.
2008) (applying the impact rule in a direct victim case with causation of the emotional dis-
tress flowing from the physical injury, notwithstanding citation to Lee).
227. See Oliver v. McDade, A14A0147, 2014 WL 3510716, at *2 (Ga. Ct. App. July 16,
2014). In Oliver, the victim/plaintiff was also the truck driver that collided with the third
party victim, killing him. The driver sustained an impact both in the force of the crash and
from the decedent’s blood.  However, instead of muddling through Lee, the court applied the
pecuniary loss exception to the impact rule. Id. at *1-2.
228. Bruscato v. O’Brien, 705 S.E.2d 275, 278 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010), aff’d, 715 S.E.2d 120
(Ga. 2011).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. See id. at 280.
233. See id. at 279.
234. Bruscato, 705 S.E.2d at 279.
235. See id. at 280-81.
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tifications for the impact rule.236 Frivolous claims were screened out by
the heightened pleading requirements.237 The flood of litigation con-
cern is addressed because a doctor-patient relationship needs to exist.
The court found it unlikely that malpractice claims would become more
numerous with the availability of emotional damages.238 Lastly, the
element of causation is not something completely determined by the
court, but governed by the applicable standards of conduct in the medi-
cal community.239 Based on the Bruscato analysis, it would appear
that special relationships do not control when the impact rule applies,
but an analysis of the impact rule justifications and their presence in
the case at bar.240
Two years after Bruscato, a federal court sitting in diversity
was unwilling to work with Georgia’s impact rule exceptions, despite
the presence of a contractual relationship, as well as fraud and slander
claims.241 The family in Hang v. Wages & Sons Funeral Home, Inc.
could not proceed on their NIED claim when the funeral home cre-
mated the decedent’s body prior to the viewing, even though the
funeral home could likely foresee emotional harm by virtue of the con-
tractual relationship with the family.242 Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins.
Co. v. Lam adds more confusion to the mix where a car crash aggra-
vated an existing mental illness.243 There was no physical injury to the
accident victim, which would normally bar the emotional damages.244
However, the impact rule did not bar the damages because the court
could clearly relate the accident to causation and none of the policy
justifications were served by applying the impact rule.245 Again, con-
siderations of policy tend to control when an otherwise mechanical
application of the impact rule would result.246
Lam also states the pecuniary loss rule.247 This rule allows for
an NIED claim to proceed when the emotional distress complained of is
236. See id.
237. See id.
238. See id. at 280-81.
239. See id. at 281.
240. See Bruscato, 705 S.E.2d at 279-81.
241. Mitchell v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 1:13-CV-00304-WSD, 2013 WL
6510783, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 12, 2013).
242. Hang v. Wages & Sons Funeral Home, Inc., 585 S.E.2d 118, 120-21 (Ga. Ct. App.
2003).
243. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Lam, 546 S.E.2d 283, 285 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
244. Id.
245. See id.
246. See Hang, 585 S.E.2d at 121; Lam, 546 S.E.2d at 285; Mitchell, 2013 WL 6510783
at *11.
247. Lam, 546 S.E.2d at 284.
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coupled with a pecuniary loss.248 The idea being that the pecuniary
loss establishes a legitimate NIED claim when there is no impact.249
However, this line of reasoning is dubious. If the driver in Lam had
borrowed her friend’s car, then that car owner could potentially claim
emotional damage if she was emotionally injured by viewing her
wrecked car. Such an absurd result would derive solely from the car
owner’s claimed emotional distress coupled with a pecuniary loss.250
McCunney v. Clary presents an even more confusing picture.251
There, a father driving his family car was struck by the defendant’s
car.252 He was unharmed, but his wife and two children were in-
jured.253 The father sued for emotional distress but found his NIED
claim barred because he was not impacted by the defendant’s negli-
gence.254 These facts would seem to implicate the Lam analysis, but
upon closer inspection, the personal injury claims had already been
settled before the NIED claim was brought, so there were no pecuniary
losses still present.255 However, the court does not explicitly dispose of
the case along these lines, instead finding the impact rule’s application
justified.256 Then, without describing why the court thought the claim
might be fraudulent or the causal connection difficult to draw, it held
there can be no NIED recovery.257
In short, Georgia’s impact rule is in a state of flux. There is no
true bystander rule,258 the ad hoc exceptions are difficult to predict,259
and the definition of an impact is stretched to avoid harsh results.260
Even with this level of unpredictability, the Georgia impact rule is still
harsher than the Florida rule. The direct victim line of cases bear simi-
larities, as both states allow contaminated food cases to proceed and
the impact required is minimal.261 Unlike the Lee case in Georgia,
248. Id.
249. See id. at 285.
250. See Oliver, 2014 WL 3510716, at *5 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
251. McCunney v. Clary, 576 S.E.2d 635, 635-36 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. See id. at 636.
256. See id.
257. See McCunney, 576 S.E.2d at 637.
258. See id. Lee is the closest to a bystander rule, but the apparent requirement of an
impact fails to distinguish the rule announced in Lee from a modern impact rule. See Lee,
533 S.E.2d at 83.
259. See Bruscato, 705 S.E.2d at 281; McCunney, 576 S.E.2d at 637.
260. See Chambley, 504 S.E.2d at 552.
261. Compare Willis, 967 So. 2d at 850, and Hagan, 804 So. 2d at 1236, with Lee, 533
S.E.2d at 86-87, and Chambley, 504 S.E.2d at 552.
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Florida has a bystander rule where impact is not required.262 While
Florida’s freestanding tort exceptions probably allow more cases to be
heard, the exceptions are at least based on the common sense applica-
tion of foreseeability and not the bizarre, more limited pecuniary loss
rule.263
C. Kansas
Kansas applies a rule that allows for liability if the plaintiff is
impacted or if there is a physical injury that results.264 In Hoard v.
Shawnee Mission Medical Center, a hospital mistakenly notified par-
ents that their daughter had died in a single car accident.265 The
daughter had in fact survived the crash but was disabled and confined
to a wheelchair.266 After the hospital realized its mistake and corrected
it, the parents were able to tend to their daughter.267 This tragic situa-
tion left the parents in dual roles as full time caretakers and
parents.268 They had medical bills to pay, both for their injuries and
their daughter’s.269 However, the parents only had a direct victim
claim on facts somewhat similar to the classic cases involving negligent
transmission of death notices.270 The physical injuries that can support
an NIED claim for the parents were those caused by, and that followed,
the misinformation of their daughter’s death: fainting, nausea, and
nightmares.271 While some damages may be successfully claimed for
these injuries, the emotional distress for which the family needed com-
pensation resulted from their daughter’s newly inflicted disabilities.272
But these emotional injuries were simply not caused by the hospital.273
Thus, direct victim cases in Kansas do not require an impact if there is
262. Compare Champion, 478 So. 2d at 18-19, and Zell, 665 So. 2d at 1054, with Lee, 533
S.E.2d at 86-87.
263. Compare Tanner, 696 So. 2d at 708, with Lam, 546 S.E.2d at 285.
264. Hoard v. Shawnee Mission Med. Ctr., 662 P.2d 1214, 1219-20 (Kan. 1983). Another
interesting aspect of the Kansas impact rule is that courts rarely call it the impact rule.
Instead, Kansas courts refer to the necessity of an impact or physical injury. See id.
265. Id. at 1216.
266. Id. at 1217-18.
267. Id. at 1217.
268. See id. at 1217-18.
269. Id. at 1219.
270. Hoard, 662 P.2d at 1220 (citing Kaufman v. W. Union Tel. Co., 224 F.2d 723 (5th
Cir. 1955)).
271. Id. at 1220.
272. See id. at 1221.
273. See id.
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a physical injury, but the physical manifestation of the injuries must
be caused by the defendant’s negligence.274
Schmeck v. City of Shawnee is the closest thing Kansas has to a
bystander case.275 In this case, a woman was thrown from a motorcycle
after being struck by a car.276 She was totally disabled by the acci-
dent.277 Her mother, who was not present at the scene and learned of
her daughter’s injuries an hour later, brought an NIED claim.278 The
mother was denied relief because she was not impacted.279 However,
the court seemed willing to recognize a bystander cause of action simi-
lar to the Dillon rule should the facts change accordingly.280
Unfortunately, this question has never been directly presented to the
Kansas Supreme Court since the Schmeck case.281
There is also no special relationship exception in Kansas, as
shown in Humes v. Clinton.282 In Humes, a doctor failed to warn his
patient of the need to replace a contraceptive device within a year.283
As a result of this failure, the patient became pregnant.284 Pregnancy
with the presence of the contraceptive device presented life-threaten-
ing risks to the mother, so she ultimately decided to have a medically
necessary abortion.285 Although the mother did contract an infectious
disease from the doctor’s negligence, that injury did not appear to be
causative of the emotional injury.286 Consequently, the impact rule ap-
plied and barred the action, regardless of the doctor-patient
relationship that existed.287
Nor does the presence of intentional or otherwise independent
torts limit the application of the impact rule. For example, in Fusaro v.
274. See id. at 1219-20; see also Ware ex rel. Ware v. ANW Special Educ. Co-op. No. 603,
180 P.3d 610, 613 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008).
275. See Schmeck v. City of Shawnee, 647 P.2d 1263, 1264 (Kan. 1982).
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. See id. at 1266.
280. See id.
281. See Tucker, 2007 WL 2155658, at *3-4; see also Smelko v. Brinton, 740 P.2d 591,
598 (Kan. 1987) (denying relief because parents were not present to witness surgical injury
to child, and did not recognize a bystander cause of action because they were in the next
room).
282. See Humes, 792 P.2d at 1034-35. While this negligence gave rise to the malpractice
action, technically, the mother argued the doctor’s negligence stemmed from his failure to
warn her of the psychological effects of having an abortion. Id. at 1038.
283. Id. at 1034-35.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. See id. at 1038.
287. Id.
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First Family Mortgage Corp., the homeowner brought trespass, inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and NIED claims when a
contractor entered the plaintiff’s house and disposed of his belong-
ings.288 This underlying conduct did not limit the application of the
impact rule.289 While emotional damages could be claimed under in-
tentional tort theories, the intent must be to cause emotional harm, not
invasion of some other legal interest.290 Therefore, in Kansas, the fore-
seeability derived from the intentional tort does not carry over into the
NIED claim.291
Of the remaining states that retain the impact rule, Kansas ap-
plies the harshest version and makes the Florida impact rule look like
a general negligence approach. The high threshold for a physical injury
or impact, lack of exceptions for freestanding torts, and the lack of a
bystander rule all stand in stark comparison to Florida law.292 Kansas
still resolves many of its impact rule cases by determining whether or
not there was an impact, rather than the foreseeability analysis that
often emerges in Florida.293 While the results of the cases are no doubt
harsh, Kansas’ unflinching adherence to the impact rule has at least
created an unrivaled clarity in the state’s NIED law.294
D. Nevada
Nevada’s direct victim cases require either an impact or physi-
cal manifestations of the injuries.295 In Chowdhry v. NLVH, Inc., for
example, the court would not allow a doctor to pursue an NIED claim
against the hospital when the hospital placed a reprimand on his re-
cord.296 Clearly there was no impact here, so the court then examined
the record for physical manifestations of the injury.297  In this analysis,
the symptoms of insomnia and general discomfort were insufficient to
qualify as physical manifestations, so the court denied the NIED
288. Fusaro v. First Family Mortg. Corp., 897 P.2d 123, 127 (Kan. 1995).
289. See id. at 131.
290. See id. at 132.
291. See id.
292. Compare Schmeck, 647 P.2d at 1264, Hoard, 662 P.2d at 1219-20, Smelko, 740 P.2d
at 598, Fusaro, 897 P.2d at 131, and Humes, 792 P.2d at 1038, with Willis, 967 So. 2d at
850, Hagan, 804 So. 2d at 1241, Zell, 665 So. 2d at 1054, and Tanner, 696 So. 2d at 708.
293. See Hagan, 804 So. 2d at 1241; Zell, 665 So. 2d at 1054.
294. See Schmeck, 647 P.2d at 1264; Hoard, 662 P.2d at 1219-20; Smelko, 740 P.2d at
598.
295. Olivero v. Lowe, 995 P.2d 1023, 1026 (Nev. 2000).
296. Chowdhry v. NLVH, Inc., 851 P.2d 459, 461-62 (Nev. 1993).
297. Id. at 462.
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claim.298 Notice two things in this analysis: first, no direct victim claim
absent an impact had actually been brought in Nevada prior to Chow-
dry, so the court’s willingness to entertain this claim signals its
eagerness to relax the impact rule.299 Second, even though the court
stated that these injuries were “insufficient to satisfy the physical im-
pact requirement,” the court still commented on the significance of the
injuries.300 Under the guise of the impact rule, the court’s analysis of
the gravity of the plaintiff’s symptoms depict this test for what it really
is—a serious injury test in disguise.301
Two years later, the court in Shoen v. Amerco established the
physical manifestations test.302 In this case, the court permitted a tor-
tiously discharged employee to pursue an NIED claim.303 Here, the
plaintiff/father built what is known today as the U-Haul company and
turned control of the company over to his sons.304 He stayed on as an
advisor and continued to draw a salary.305 In this capacity, he devel-
oped bi-polar disorder, and the U-Haul company paid disability
payments to him since he could no longer work.306 Meanwhile, the fa-
ther gave damaging testimony against his sons in an IRS hearing.307
Shortly thereafter, he was fired and the disability payments
stopped.308 After these events unfolded, the father was diagnosed with
situational depression.309 The court accepted this diagnosis as evidence
of an emotional injury without an impact.310 This sliding scale required
a higher showing of physical injury when the degree of outrageous con-
duct was less, and vice versa.311 This blurs the line between
freestanding tort cases and direct victim cases, but underscores the
theme common to a modern impact rule: foreseeability.312
298. See id.
299. See id.
300. Id.
301. See id.
302. Shoen v. Amerco, Inc., 896 P.2d 469, 477 (Nev. 1995).
303. Id.
304. Id. at 471.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 471-72.
308. Shoen, 896 P.2d at 471-72.
309. Id. at 477. Reading Shoen in isolation, one might conclude that the impact rule was
abolished, as there are not necessarily physical symptoms for depression. However, the
court seems to indicate in Olivero that it is unwilling to completely move away from the
impact rule. See Olivero, 995 P.2d at 1026.
310. See id.
311. See id.
312. See id.
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A contrary result is shown in Bartmettler v. Reno Air, where an
employer violated a confidentiality agreement with the employee re-
garding his alcohol abuse problems.313 This claim was not allowed to
proceed because the “serious emotional distress” alleged by the em-
ployee was insufficient to meet the physical manifestation rule.314
There is no sliding scale analysis in Barmettler despite the possibility
of intentional conduct, so the court apparently resolved this case under
the serious injury rule.315 It would appear that the serious injury rule
is the controlling factor, with the sliding scale test being invoked in
close cases; otherwise, the victim in Bartmettler would have been de-
prived of the full protection of Nevada’s impact rule.316
In a malpractice action, the operation of the impact rule is ab-
sent.317 In Kahn v. Morse & Mowbray, emotional damages based on
acts potentially constituting malpractice were inappropriate because
the gist of a legal malpractice action is economic damages.318 Thus,
emotional harm that is premised upon the loss of money is unforesee-
able.319 This is a difficult holding to square with Shoen, as the gist of a
tortious discharge claim is primarily economic, but the NIED claim can
still go forward.320 Here the malpractice-type conduct alongside the
NIED claim has no effect, possibly implying that the sliding scale test
is only invoked when the quasi-intentional conduct is intended to emo-
tionally harm the victim.321
Nevada’s bystander rule is similar to the Dillon rule.322 A by-
stander must be emotionally distressed by witnessing injury to a close
relative, and must be near the scene of the incident.323 The most recent
refinement of the rule is in Grotts v. Zahner.324 There, a fiance´ could
not recover on her NIED claim, despite witnessing the death of her
fiance´ in an accident, because she was not a member of the decedent’s
family.325
313. Barmettler v. Reno Air, Inc., 956 P.2d 1382, 1384 (Nev. 1998).
314. See id. at 1387.
315. See id.
316. See Shoen, 896 P.2d at 477. But see Barmettler, 956 P.2d at 1387 (applying the
serious injury rule, not the sliding scale analysis).
317. Kahn v. Morse & Mowbray, 117 P.3d 227, 237 (Nev. 2005).
318. See id.
319. Id.
320. See Shoen, 896 P.2d at 477. But see Kahn, 117 P.3d at 237 (considering emotional
damages when the claim is premised on an unlawful discharge).
321. See Shoen, 896 P.2d at 477. But see Kahn, 117 P.3d at 237.
322. Grotts v. Zahner, 989 P.2d 415, 416 (Nev. 1999).
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. See id.
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Nevada’s impact rule is similar to Florida’s but stricter, mainly
due to the impact rule’s application when freestanding torts are pre-
sent.326 Otherwise, the direct victim line allows an NIED claim with
only physical manifestations,327 the bystander rule is based on a close
relative witnessing an injury to another,328 and the serious injury test
is applied to borderline claims; all these cases look like Florida tort
law.329 Florida does not explicitly subscribe to a serious injury rule, but
the case law bears out the functional equivalent of that test.330 The
freestanding tort exception distinguishes Florida from Nevada. Ne-
vada’s sliding scale test, which surfaces when intentional torts are
present, is similar, but the Nevada impact rule still has application in
these types of cases when the intentional conduct is not targeted at
emotional harm, as opposed to a broader foreseeability analysis.331
In summary, of all five states retaining the impact rule, the con-
struction of the rule in Florida is the least like an actual impact rule.
This reading of the Florida impact rule is created either through excep-
tions, limits to its application, or de minimis satisfaction of the impact
requirement.332 This exception-riddled construction has the effect of
making the law more complex than it needs to be. If Florida NIED law
already looks like a general negligence approach in comparison to
other states, why not simply switch to one?
III. THE EVOLUTION OF AD HOC EXCEPTIONS TO CLARITY
A. Tennessee and the Physical Symptoms Rule
Tennessee does not use the impact rule, but does require physi-
cal manifestations of emotional distress to find a viable NIED claim.333
Thus, a discussion of Camper v. Minor is relevant because Tennessee’s
rejection of a physical manifestation would be equivalent to abrogation
of Florida’s impact rule.334 In Camper, a driver disobeyed a stop sign
326. Compare Kahn, 117 P.3d at 237, with Rowell, 850 So. 2d at 476-77.
327. Compare Olivero, 995 P.2d at 1026, and Chowdhry, 851 P.2d at 462, with Willis,
967 So. 2d at 850, and Zell, 665 So. 2d at 1054.
328. Compare Grotts, 989 P.2d at 416, with Zell, 665 So. 2d at 1054.
329. Compare Barmettler, 956 P.2d at 1387, with Elliott, 58 So. 3d at 882 (denying
NIED claim because headaches, loss of appetite, and hair loss are insufficient injuries).
330. See Elliott, 58 So. 3d at 882.
331. Compare Bartmettler, 956 P.2d at 1387, with Tanner, 696 So. 2d at 708.
332. See Willis, 967 So. 2d at 850; Zell, 665 So. 2d at 1054; Tanner, 696 So. 2d at 708.
333. Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437, 443 (Tenn. 1996). This case contains an excel-
lent discussion of the history of the impact rule as well. See id. at 440-43.
334. Id. at 439.
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and pulled out in front of a cement truck at a highway intersection.335
The driver of the car was killed instantly.336 The cement truck driver
walked around to the crushed car and saw the driver’s dead body at
close range.337 While undiagnosed at the time of trial, the truck driver
claimed to be reliving the accident over and over.338
Prior to Camper, even with the more relaxed physical manifes-
tation rule, Tennessee still had the same history of ad hoc
exceptions.339 Unsurprisingly, these cases follow a similar pattern.340
Situations in which emotional damages could foreseeably result
trumped the physical manifestations rule: mutilation of a husband’s
corpse;341 fear of injury after consuming contaminated water;342 exper-
iencing mental, but no physical injuries from a car crash;343 and
finding a cigar stub in a bottle of Coke.344 Faced with inequitable and
illogical results of a strictly construed barrier to NIED claims, Tennes-
see chose to create exceptions, expand to absurdity the construction of
a physical manifestation, limit the rule’s applicability, and use public
policy arguments to come to conclusions contrary to established law.345
Camper provided Tennessee with a rule to obtain emotional
damages where the plaintiff can, through expert testimony, show emo-
tional damages with which a reasonable person would be unable to
cope.346 Post-Camper, Tennessee law functions similar to pre-Camper
cases, with the exception of a focus on predictability.347 Take, for exam-
ple, Flax v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.348 There, a truck driver rear-ended
a minivan, resulting in the collapse of a passenger seat which ulti-
mately killed the bystander’s son.349 The mother then brought an
NIED claim against the manufacturer of the minivan.350 Prior to
Camper, the mother in Flax likely would not have had difficulty bring-
ing this claim, as the facts in Flax fall squarely within the ad hoc
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Camper, 915 S.W.2d at 444.
340. See id.
341. Hill v. Travelers’ Ins. Co., 294 S.W. 1097, 1099 (Tenn. 1927).
342. Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tenn. 1982).
343. Johnson Freight Lines, Inc. v. Tallent, 384 S.W.2d 46, 50 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964).
344. Boyd v. Coca Cola Bottling Works, 177 S.W. 80, 81 (Tenn. 1915).
345. See Camper, 915 S.W.2d at 446.
346. Id. at 531.
347. Flax v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 272 S.W.3d 521, 531 (Tenn. 2008).
348. See id.
349. Id. at 525-26.
350. Id.
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exceptions to the physical manifestation rule.351 However, after
Camper, emotional damages can be won if the plaintiff can show the
injury is one with which a reasonable person would be unable to
cope.352 Such emotional damage must be proven through expert
testimony.353
The functional difference after Camper is predictability.354 Iron-
ically, the plaintiff in Flax argued that expert testimony should not be
required because a mother witnessing the death of her child is such an
obvious source of emotional harm.355 This reasoning worked well pre-
Camper;356 however, in Flax, the court sought to avoid the type of ad
hoc case law that NIED claims produced prior to Camper.357 The
court’s denial of the NIED claim comports with this goal, for here it is
not necessarily the causation in question, but the amount of damages.
Recall the evidence justification for the impact rule-that emotional
damages are difficult to prove.358 In this case, the problem is not causa-
tion, but how to value the damages the mother seeks for her NIED
claim.359 Camper’s requirement of expert testimony for such injuries
takes some subjectivity out of that equation.360 In other words, abroga-
tion of the physical manifestation rule in Tennessee resulted in more
predictable case law, all the while still allowing meritorious claims.361
B. Kentucky and the Impact Rule
Kentucky recently abolished the impact rule in Osborne v. Kee-
ney.362 In Osborne, a negligent airplane pilot struck the plaintiff’s
home, destroying her chimney and setting her house on fire.363 The
homeowner suffered from depression, hypertension, insomnia, anxiety,
and diabetes prior to the plane crash, but the medical expert at trial
testified the crash exacerbated these conditions.364 However, the
351. See id. at 531.
352. Id. at 528.
353. Flax, 272 S.W.3d at 528.
354. See id. at 531.
355. See id.
356. See id.
357. See id.
358. Kircher, supra note 14, at 808.
359. See Flax, 272 S.W.3d at 531.
360. See id.
361. See id.
362. Osborne, 399 S.W.3d at 6.
363. Id.
364. Id.
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homeowner was not physically struck by any plane debris or pieces of
her house.365 After the crash, she retained an attorney to represent her
against the pilot and work with her insurance company.366 Her attor-
ney took twenty percent of payments as his fee from the homeowner’s
insurance company and told the homeowner more payments would be
coming as her claims against the pilot progressed.367 Two years later,
she still wanted to proceed against the pilot.368 Unbeknownst to the
homeowner, the statute of limitations had run, so her attorney at-
tempted to discourage her from filing suit against the pilot.369 The
homeowner insisted, and her attorney filed the complaint with the
court.370 The court, in turn, granted summary judgment against the
homeowner because of the time bar.371 The attorney never disclosed
that the statute of limitations expired to his client, so she filed a mal-
practice suit against him.372 At trial, the homeowner first needed to
show she would have prevailed on the negligence claim against the air-
plane pilot, and then she could show that she was robbed of this result
by her lawyer’s incompetence.373 Thus, two separate instances of con-
duct provided the basis for her emotional distress: the airplane crash
itself and her lawyer’s representation. Her attorney asserted the im-
pact rule as a defense to the NIED claims, and the lower court
agreed.374 Their decision was in turn affirmed by the court of appeals
in Kentucky.375
The Supreme Court of Kentucky took this opportunity to abro-
gate the impact rule and handle NIED claims as general negligence
actions, but required that the plaintiff demonstrate the injury was seri-
ous.376 Their opinion began with an overview of impact rule
jurisprudence in Kentucky and it followed a familiar pattern.377 The
court had previously adopted the impact rule because it provided a
365. Id.
366. Id. at 6-7.
367. Id. at 7.
368. Osborne, 399 S.W.3d at 7.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. See id. at 8.
374. Osborne, 399 S.W.3d at 8.
375. Id. Under Kentucky law, a malpractice suit is tried as a suit within a suit. Essen-
tially, this means the court would hear the underlying case where the pilot hit the house to
determine the result without the lawyer’s incompetence. Then, the malpractice action is
heard to determine if the lawyer is actually at fault. Id. at 10.
376. See id. at 17.
377. Id. at 15.
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bright line test as to when a person’s emotional state could be
foreseeably injured.378 The court feared it would be difficult to screen
out fraudulent claims and that a flood of litigants would clog the dock-
ets.379 However, over time, this bright line excluded clearly meritorious
claims, so the courts resorted to exceptions and varying constructions
of an impact in order to avoid harsh results.380 For example, in Deutsch
v. Shein, the court held bombarding a person’s body with X-rays consti-
tuted an impact.381 In this case, a doctor repeatedly X-rayed a
pregnant woman without first determining if pregnancy was the cause
of her symptoms.382 Certainly, there was no apparent physical im-
pact.383 Thus, with no exception, the impact rule would have prevented
the mother’s NIED claim despite the obvious and well-known conse-
quences of exposing a fetus to X-rays.384 In Wilhoite v. Cobb, a mother
watched a truck strike her infant daughter, who ultimately died from
her injuries.385 The court denied relief because there was no physical
impact upon the mother.386 Therefore, until Osborne, the Common-
wealth of Kentucky still applied the impact rule rather harshly387 and
had no bystander rule.388 The Osborne court reasoned that, although
the justifications for the impact rule are no less valid today than they
were 200 years ago, these goals could be achieved more effectively
through the serious injury rule ensconced within a negligence
action.389
Post-Osborne cases show the same features as post-Camper
cases: functionally similar case law with clearer guidelines as to why
an NIED claim may or may not fail.390 Keaton v. G.C. Williams Fu-
neral Home, Inc. involved an NIED claim where a funeral home buried
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Osborne, 399 S.W.3d at 15.
381. Id. (citing Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 146 (Ky. 1980)).
382. Deutsch, 597 S.W.2d at 142.
383. See id. at 146.
384. Id.
385. Wilhoite v. Cobb, 761 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).
386. Id. The trial court did note the absurdity in the distinction between the X-rays that
caused the mother’s harm in Deutsch and the light rays, which caused the mother’s pain
here. Id.
387. See Steel Techs., Inc. v. Congleton, 234 S.W.3d 920, 930 (Ky. 2007) (barring a claim
for emotional damages prior to the ultimately fatal impact in a car crash).
388. See Wilhoite, 761 S.W.2d at 626.
389. See id. at 17-18.
390. Keaton v. G.C. Williams Funeral Home, Inc., 436 S.W.3d 538, 541 (Ky. Ct. App.
2013); see Osborne, 399 S.W.3d at 18. Keaton actually began before Osborne was decided,
but Osborne was retroactive, so its holding applied. Keaton, 436 S.W.3d at 543-44.
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the remains of the family’s mother in the wrong plot.391 The family
discovered the mistake and was present when the casket was moved to
the correct plot.392 The court denied the NIED claim because the only
evidence presented regarding the emotional harm was the family’s
statement of their own distress, with no expert testimony, as required
under Osborne.393 Just like Tennessee after Camper, Kentucky is able
to screen out speculative injuries and remove subjectivity from dam-
ages, ensuring the law regarding NIED claims is predictable without
the ad hoc exceptions.394
C. The Flood of Litigation
Tennessee and Kentucky have apparently managed to control
the ensuing flood of litigation. In the 2012-13 fiscal year, there were
9,868 tort cases and 385 medical malpractice claims filed in Tennes-
see.395 Combined, there were 10,253 cases that could potentially have
facts that support an NIED claim.396 The number is probably less than
this, as it is unlikely every tort case filed in Tennessee has an NIED
component. But, assuming the worst-case scenario, there is roughly
one potential NIED claim filed for every 630 persons in Tennessee,
with a small decrease from the previous year.397 Kentucky does not
specifically track tort cases; however, in using total civil cases in gen-
eral, in 2013 there was approximately one civil case filed in Kentucky
for every 100 people living there, again with a small decrease from
2012.398 Recall in Kentucky that the impact rule was abolished in
391. Keaton, 436 S.W.3d at 541.
392. Id.
393. Id. at 544.
394. See Osborne, 399 S.W.3d at 18; Keaton, 436 S.W.3d at 544; Powell v. Tosh, 942 F.
Supp. 2d 678, 696 (W.D. Ky. 2013) (denying emotional damages based on the noxious odors
from a pig farm due to lack of expert testimony on damages); Taylor v. JPMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A., CIV. 13-24-GFVT, 2014 WL 66513, at *7 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 8, 2014) (denying an
NIED claim when plaintiff had to wait seven days for a check to clear).
395. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE TENNESSEE JUDICIARY FISCAL YEAR 2012-2013 330 (2013),
available at http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/docs/annual_report_tn_judiciary_fy
_2012-13_2-4-14.pdf [hereinafter TENNESSEE CASELOAD].
396. See id.
397. See id.; State & County QuickFacts: Tennessee, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/47000.html (last updated Apr. 22, 2015).
398. KENTUCKY COURTS CASE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, STATEWIDE CASELOAD REPORT
(2014), available at http://courts.ky.gov/aoc/statisticalreports/Documents/StatewideCase
loadReport_Circuit.pdf [hereinafter KENTUCKY CASELOAD]; State & County QuickFacts: Ken-
tucky, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/21000.html (last
updated Apr. 22, 2015).
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2012.399 If the feared proverbial flood of litigation had ensued, Ken-
tucky would in fact have seen an increased caseload in 2013. Yet, it
appears as if the levees held.400
Florida, on the other hand, tracks cases much more specifically.
In 2013, 34,790 tort cases were filed at the circuit level.401 In 2012,
that number was 35,595.402 This means that there are about 550 peo-
ple in Florida for every tort case filed, a figure that went down from
2012.403 What these numbers depict is that total caseload is more de-
pendent on other economic factors, not the availability of emotional
damages.404 If the impact rule is abolished in Florida, litigation rates
will not likely increase significantly, or necessarily at all.405 The sim-
plicity that could result from eliminating the impact rule could just as
easily help judicial efficiency by creating more predictable, and there-
fore more manageable, judicial standards.406
Formal abrogation of the Florida impact rule should follow an
approach similar to the Osborne case in Kentucky, whereby the court
would implement a serious injury rule to screen out frivolous claims
and apply a general negligence approach. Again, this is nearly the
functional equivalent of what is already happening in Florida tort law,
as Florida already screens NIED claims for serious injuries when they
are filed.407 In granting the freestanding tort exceptions and allowing
for a de minimis impact, Florida is not applying the impact rule.408
Instead, the courts are analyzing the alleged tortious conduct to see if
the tortfeasor could have foreseen the emotional injury.409
399. See Osborne, 399 S.W.2d at 24.
400. See KENTUCKY CASELOAD, supra note 398.
401. FLORIDA OFFICE OF THE STATE COURTS ADMINISTRATOR, FY 2012-13 STATISTICAL
REFERENCE GUIDE 4-2 (2014), available at http://www.flcourts.org/core/fileparse.php/250/
urlt/reference-guide-1213-circuit-civ.pdf.
402. Id. The malpractice cases in Florida were left out of this calculation since the im-
pact rule does not apply in that context. See Tanner, 696 So. 2d at 706.
403. FLORIDA OFFICE OF THE STATE COURTS ADMINISTRATOR, FY 2011-12 STATISTICAL
REFERENCE GUIDE 4-2 (2012), available at http://www.flcourts.org/core/fileparse.php/250/
urlt/ReferenceGuide11-12-Chp4.pdf.
404. Lance Bachmeier et al., The Volume of Federal Litigation and the Macroeconomy,
24 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 191, 206 (2004). Macroeconomic factors such as output and infla-
tion are discussed, not the availability of emotional damages. See id.
405. See id.; Frank B. Cross, Tort Law and the American Economy, 96 MINN. L. REV. 28,
81 (2011). Cross argues that pro-plaintiff tort law is not harmful to the economy and may
actually be beneficial. One of the reasons for this counter intuitive conclusion is the higher
degree of predictability of tort law in pro-plaintiff forums. See id.
406. Id.
407. Compare Elliott, 58 So. 3d at 882, with Osborne, 399 S.W.3d at 17.
408. See Elliott, 58 So. 3d at 882.
409. Hagan, 804 So. 2d at 1241; Tanner, 696 So. 2d at 708.
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With the adoption of an approach based on foreseeability, the
outcome of NIED claims would become more predictable. Judicial effi-
ciency would then be served by fewer appeals, or at least appeals in
which the applicable law is clearer. Furthermore, a judgment would
have more finality to it if it were not contingent upon the impact rule.
Litigants would no longer have to think up creative complaints in order
to satisfy the impact rule and plaintiffs would know which injuries
would get past the motion to dismiss stage.410  Most importantly, par-
ties would know which injuries are actually frivolous through a body of
case law that delineates which injuries are serious.411 If Florida
adopts, in form, what it already does in substance, the real gain for all
parties involved would be case predictability.
IV. FLORIDA IMPACT RULE CASES UNDER A GENERAL
NEGLIGENCE APPROACH
To show that Florida case law would change little after abroga-
tion of the impact rule, two types of cases discussed above will be
analyzed under a general negligence approach, utilizing a serious in-
jury rule: direct victim cases and freestanding tort cases.412
A. Direct Victim Cases
The facts of Hardy v. Pier 99 Motor Inn are helpful for analyz-
ing direct victim cases because it presents facts similar to Willis.413  In
Hardy, a motel guest saw his friend fatally stabbed in the motel park-
ing lot and got into an altercation with the attacker.414  In this fight,
the attacker stabbed the motel guest.415  He brought suit, arguing that
the motel should have foreseen this attack due to the numerous crimi-
nal incidents that had occurred on the motel’s property.416 However,
most importantly, the motel guest sued for physical injuries he sus-
tained in the attack.417 Consequently, there is no analysis of whether
410. See Elliott, 58 So. 3d at 882; Osborne, 399 S.W.3d at 18.
411. Osborne requires the plaintiff to use expert testimony to express the damages more
objectively. Such a change would be unnecessary in Florida, as the courts have been able to
value emotional distress damages and use experts when necessary. See, e.g., Hagan, 804 So.
2d at 1241 (no expert for damages); Zell, 665 So. 2d at 1049-50 (using expert testimony).
412. Bystander cases would be no different absent the impact rule because Florida al-
ready uses a version of the Dillon rule in those cases. See Zell, 665 So. 2d at 1049-50.
413. Hardy v. Pier 99 Motor Inn, 664 So. 2d 1095, 1096-97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. See id. (emphasis added).
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the injury was compensable since a stab wound is an impact.418 This
left the hotel’s foreseeability of the attack the remaining issue.419 For
this type of showing, the court looked at past incidents and 911 calls to
the hotel premises.420
Compare this to the facts of de Saric v. Miami Caribe Invest-
ments, Inc.421 In de Saric, two hotel guests, mother and daughter, were
escorted to their room by hotel personnel.422 After settling in for about
an hour, they opened the door to leave and were confronted by two
masked robbers, one of whom had a gun.423 One robber forced the
daughter into the bathroom where she fainted.424 After regaining con-
sciousness, the robber searched her for hidden jewelry.425 Meanwhile,
the other robber ordered the mother to lie on the floor while he stole
money and jewelry from her purse.426 The hotel guests were not physi-
cally injured in any serious way but suffered from emotional distress
for which they could point to physical symptoms.427 They brought suit
against the hotel for this emotional distress and were barred by the
impact rule.428
The impact rule today would not bar this claim because the de
minimis impact endured by the hotel guests would now be sufficient to
bring an NIED claim.429 More importantly though, under a general
negligence approach, the touchstone of the analysis would be the fore-
seeability of the attack based upon the hotel’s awareness of similar
incidents.430 Such a rule is more logical because foreseeability is the
guidepost of the analysis. Under the impact rule, the hotel would only
be under a duty to prevent robbers who physically touch their victims
in the slightest way, but not those who hold a victim at gunpoint.431
The Florida Supreme Court has already noted the harsh results of
“sacrific[ing] the first victim’s right to safety upon the altar of foresee-
ability . . .,” but that is what the impact rule would have the courts
418. See id.
419. See id. at 1098.
420. Id.
421. de Saric v. Miami Caribe Invs., Inc., 512 F.2d 1013, 1014 (5th Cir. 1975).
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. de Saric, 512 F.2d at 1014.
428. Id.
429. See Willis, 967 So. 2d at 850; Hardy, 664 So. 2d at 1098.
430. See Hardy, 664 So. 2d at 1098.
431. See id. But see de Saric, 512 F.2d at 1014.
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do.432 Again, there is no functional change to the law. The NIED claim
can still go forward after Willis. The only difference would be in evi-
dence of previous incidents and hotel security being relevant concerns,
as opposed to whether or not the gun held by the robber touched the
victim.433
Applying this same reasoning to the facts of Willis, the opinion
would be several pages shorter and still come to the same natural con-
clusion. Of course a hotel guest victimized by negligent hotel staff and
then an armed robber will sustain a serious emotional injury. The
merit of that claim should not turn on whether the hotel guest was
physically touched by the gun.  Rather, the prior incidents at the hotel
and actions of hotel personnel should be considered.434
B. Serious Injury Test
The serious injury test contemplates the magnitude of the in-
jury, not foreseeability. In other words, courts recognize there are
genuine cases of emotional distress, but fear the subjectivity inherent
in such an injury would have no stopping point.435 The serious injury
test addresses that fear by setting a threshold for what types of inju-
ries may support an NIED claim, usually requiring expert
testimony.436 To view how the serious injury test would work in Flor-
ida, the facts of Elliot v. Elliot are instructive.437 There, a family
member dismembered his mother’s corpse and scattered her ashes over
the family farm, contrary to her and her family’s wishes.438 The family
members sued for negligent infliction of emotional distress.439 The
family did not witness any of these events, so they argued they fit
within the physical manifestation of emotional trauma exception since
there was no impact.440 The injuries alleged included: stress, insomnia,
hair loss, anxiety, diarrhea, headaches, diabetes, and sleep apnea.441
432. See Hardy, 664 So. 2d at 1098.
433. See Willis, 967 So. 2d at 850; Hardy, 664 So. 2d at 1098. But see de Saric, 512 F.2d
at 1014.
434. See Hardy, 664 So. 2d at 1098 (totaling 3 pages). But see Willis, 967 So. 2d at 850
(totaling 32 pages including concurrences and dissents, 25 pages of which are dedicated to a
discussion of the impact rule).
435. Joseph Matye, Bystander Recovery for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress in
Missouri, 60 UMKC L. REV. 169, 188 (1991).
436. See id. at 170.
437. Elliott, 58 So. 3d at 879.
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. Id.
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The court held the physical manifestations exception was still not of
such a low threshold to allow a lawsuit for these types of injuries, par-
ticularly when supported by weak expert testimony or none at all.442
Elliot is more forthright in its analysis of the physical manifes-
tations prong of the impact rule.443 Other cases require reading
between the lines a bit more. For example, even though not technically
required under Florida law, NIED cases are still resolved solely on the
lack of an impact. In Janie Doe 1 ex rel. Miranda v. Sinrod, the under-
lying basis of the NIED claim was the sexual molestation of the
plaintiffs’ child by a school teacher.444 The parents filed the original
complaint to the school board in 2006, but the NIED claim five years
later.445 Here, the seriousness of the injury is dubious when the victim
waited five years to file the claim. However, more to the point, the
court resolved the claim by requiring an impact. When the family
claimed physical manifestations in the absence of an impact, the court
limited that prong to bystander type cases.446 Cases like this poten-
tially do not receive a full-on impact rule analysis because they appear
to be frivolous claims for reasons not so easily articulated in the opin-
ion. However, if a serious injury test were part of Florida tort law, then
the opinion could literally read “this injury is not serious enough,” just
as Elliot does.447
Again, Florida law would change very little. As Elliot demon-
strates, the serious injury test is already part of Florida law.448 It
simply is not applied predictably because the law surrounding the im-
pact rule is anything but predictable. Clear abrogation of the impact
rule and approval of the test in Elliot would solve that problem.
442. Id.; see also Langbehn v. Pub. Health Trust of Miami-Dade Cnty., 661 F. Supp. 2d
1326, 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (assessing seriousness of exacerbation of multiple sclerosis, nau-
sea, stomach pain stemming from denial of access to plaintiff’s dying life partner at the
hospital); Brown v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., 468 So. 2d 903, 904 (Fla. 1985) (requiring
death, paralysis, muscular impairment, or some other physical ailment absent an impact);
LeGrande v. Emmanuel, 889 So. 2d 991, 995 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (pleading exacerba-
tion of existing diabetes and memory loss).
443. See Elliott, 58 So. 3d at 879.
444. Janie Doe 1 ex rel. Miranda v. Sinrod, 117 So. 3d 786, 787 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
445. Id. at 788.
446. Id.; see also Arditi v. Grove Isle Ass’n, Inc., 905 So. 2d 151, 153 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2004) (holding that the impact rule barred the claim despite the victim’s heart attack); Riv-
ers v. Grimsley Oil Co., 842 So. 2d 975, 977 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (denying an NIED
claim on facts similar to Willis where post-traumatic stress disorder and anxiety were medi-
cally controlled after a robbery); Testa v. S. Escrow & Title, LLC, 36 So. 3d 713, 714 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (dismissing NIED claim because there was no physical injury stemming
from an impact despite the post Willis state of the impact rule).
447. See Elliott, 58 So. 3d at 879.
448. See id.
\\jciprod01\productn\F\FAM\10-2\FAM201.txt unknown Seq: 40 22-APR-16 13:09
306 FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW Vol. 10:2:267
C. Freestanding Tort Cases
Freestanding tort cases would be simpler, as the results would
be based on foreseeability, not impacts. To bring a negligence claim
with freestanding tort facts, a plaintiff must argue that the underlying
tortious conduct created foreseeability. Currently, that reasoning ap-
plies to attorney-client malpractice, doctor-patient malpractice,
intentional torts, and torts where damages are primarily non-eco-
nomic.449 If a general negligence analysis were applied to these types of
cases, a court would simply examine whether or not the defendant was
under a duty since that is the touchstone of foreseeability in negli-
gence. The detour through the impact rule and its freestanding tort
limitation is unnecessary.
The next likely instance in which Florida will have to deal with
NIED claims will be veterinary malpractice.450 In Kennedy v. Byas, the
First DCA denied an NIED claim stemming from veterinary malprac-
tice.451 The doctor performed an operation on the owner’s dog.452 After
the operation, the doctor left the dog on a heating pad, resulting in
severe burns.453 The court denied relief because of the impact rule, but
not before commenting on the merits of a veterinary malpractice
exception.454
Unsurprisingly, Kush is the genesis of the asserted veterinary
malpractice exception, where the malpractice conduct is sufficient to
trigger foreseeable warning signs for the defendant.455 Hence, in the
veterinary context, the question is whether the veterinarian should
foresee the potential for emotional harm. The impact rule would say no
because, obviously, the owner is not impacted, and the impact is sus-
tained by the pet, if at all. However, the foreseeability analysis is more
telling. Florida law compensates a pet owner for the property value of
the animal in a veterinary malpractice claim.456 Consequently, it
449. See Tanner, 696 So. 2d at 706.
450. Rebecca J. Huss, Valuation in Veterinary Malpractice, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 479, 492
(2004); Mary Margaret McEachern Nunalee & G. Robert Weedon, Modern Trends in Veteri-
nary Malpractice: How Our Evolving Attitudes Toward Non-Human Animals Will Change
Veterinary Medicine, 10 ANIMAL L. 125, 159 (2004); Jay M. Zitter, Recovery of Damages for
Emotional Distress Due to Treatment of Pets and Animals, 91 A.L.R. 5th 545, § 2 (2001).
451. Kennedy v. Byas, 867 So. 2d 1195, 1196 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. See id.
456. Id.
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would be unfair to sue a veterinarian for an NIED sized judgment
when the replacement cost of the pet is less than $400.457
The Third DCA reasoned differently in Knowles Animal Hospi-
tal, Inc. v. Wills, where an award for $13,000 in emotional damages
was affirmed on almost identical facts with no impact rule analysis.458
This case, while notably lacking in foreseeability analysis, is not with-
out merit. The average veterinarian bill runs about $500 a year, with
some people spending upwards of $1,000 on more serious injuries.459
Surely such expenditures show a pet owner is more emotionally in-
vested in a pet than its property value. The opinion does contain hints
of the freestanding tort exception when discussing the “gross negli-
gence” of the veterinarian, but both Johnson and Knowles come before
Kush.460
Whichever way this split goes, it makes more sense for the out-
come to be based on the degree of foreseeability the veterinarian
possesses, not whether the veterinarian touched the pet owner in the
course of treatment.461 Under a general negligence approach, the de-
gree of foreseeability would be determined by what type of treatment
the pet was receiving and how the market value of the pet compared to
the cost of the care. Thus, the doctor in Kennedy might have been on
notice the dog owner was emotionally invested in his dog when he paid
for a veterinary operation in the first place.462 However, the fundamen-
tal point here is that there is little difference in the case law after
negligence principles apply. Both Knowles and Kennedy already ex-
amine the foreseeability to determine if the impact rule should bar the
claim.463 Knowles does not even examine the impact rule, finding the
emotional distress an obvious conclusion from the nature of the veteri-
narian’s conduct.464 If the serious injury test has any application in
Florida, it will be in these veterinary malpractice cases. Pets are val-
ued differently by different people. Before awarding an NIED sized
457. Kennedy, 867 So. 2d at 1196. The damages in Kennedy constituted $350 for replac-
ing the basset hound and $50 for a fraud claim associated with the bill. Id. at 1196-97.
458. See Knowles Animal Hosp., Inc. v. Wills, 360 So. 2d 37, 38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1978).
459. Sue Manning, Poll: Vet Visits a Pricey Trip for Pet Owners, USA TODAY (Nov. 30,
2011), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2011-11-30/pet-care-costs/514879
92/1; Liz Weston, Should You Buy Pet Insurance?, MSN MONEY (Nov. 4, 2010), http://money
.msn.com/insurance/should-you-buy-pet-insurance-weston.aspx.
460. Knowles, 360 So. 2d at 38; see Johnson v. Wander, 592 So. 2d 1225, 1226 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1992) (affirming the holding in Knowles on nearly identical facts).
461. See Kennedy, 867 So. 2d at 1196.
462. But see id.
463. See id.; Knowles, 360 So. 2d at 38.
464. See Knowles, 360 So. 2d at 38.
\\jciprod01\productn\F\FAM\10-2\FAM201.txt unknown Seq: 42 22-APR-16 13:09
308 FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW Vol. 10:2:267
judgment to a plaintiff, a court will want to be sure the emotional dis-
tress suffered by the pet owner is genuine.465
The takeaway point here is not that Osborne resulted in better
case law, but that it resulted in clearer case law.466 Florida is already
doing this analysis.467 The foreseeability analysis is the same as a gen-
eral negligence analysis. There is already a serious injury test. All that
is left to do is eliminate the detour through the impact rule.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the impact rule in Florida is already functionally
abolished and the practical effect of it is indistinguishable from a more
modern approach to NIED claims. Moreover, the traditional justifica-
tions of judicial efficiency, evidence concerns, and foreseeability are not
served by the exception riddled version of the impact rule Florida cur-
rently follows. Compared to the remaining states that have yet to
abolish the impact rule, Florida’s rule is the most complex in either
creating exceptions or liberally construing the impact requirement. To
truly serve these interests, predictable tort law is desirable, which is
where Florida’s impact rule has its most profoundly negative impact.
465. Margit Livingston, The Calculus of Animal Valuation: Crafting a Viable Remedy,
82 NEB. L. REV. 783, 820 (2004); William C. Root, “Man’s Best Friend”: Property or Family
Member? An Examination of the Legal Classification of Companion Animals and Its Impact
on Damages Recoverable for Their Wrongful Death or Injury, 47 VILL. L. REV. 423, 447
(2002).
466. Flax, 272 S.W.3d at 531.
467. See, e.g., Willis, 967 So. 2d at 850; Elliott, 58 So. 3d at 882.
